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NOTES
TAHOE-SIERRA PRESERVATION COUNCIL, INC.
V. TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY: THE
SUPREME COURT REAFFIRMS THE
IMPORTANCE OF LAND-USE PLANNING AND
WISELY REFUSES TO SET CONCRETE OUTER
LIMITS
Charles V. Dumas IIf
Lake Tahoe has been recognized as one of the most beautiful and serene
places in the United States.' This lofty alpine lake was the catalyst for the
Supreme Court's most recent regulatory takings case. In Tahoe-Sierra
PreservationCouncil, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency, the Court
held that two development moratoria totaling thirty-two months did not
constitute a taking, a result that was both somewhat surprising in light of
the Court's prior regulatory takings cases and hotly debated.2 The Fifth
+ J.D.

Candidate, May 2004, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
1. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in Tahoe-SierraPres. Council,Inc. v. Tahoe
Reg'l PlanningAgency, 535 U.S. 302,307 (2002), summarized the praise Lake Tahoe receives.
The district court called the lake "uniquely beautiful," President Clinton felt it is a "national
treasure that must be protected and preserved," and Mark Twain remarked that it is "not
merely transparent, but dazzlingly, brilliantly so." Id. (citations omitted). Lake Tahoe, the
second-deepest lake in the United States, is located on the border between California and
Nevada.
Facts About Lake Tahoe, Lake Tahoe Data Clearinghouse, at
http://blt.wr.usgs.gov/facts.html (last modified June 17,2003); Geography & History Overview,
Lake Tahoe Data Clearinghouse, at http://blt.wr.usgs.gov/geography.html (last modified Jan.
16, 2003).
2. The surprise stems in part from Tahoe-Sierra'salleged divergence from the Court's
opinion in FirstEnglish Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304 (1987). In FirstEnglish, the Supreme Court held that a temporary restriction on
land requires compensation if the restriction constitutes a taking. Id. at 318. Chief Justice
Rehnquist, although avoiding any extension of the Court's holding to land-use planning in
general, intimated that the holding may make land-use planning tools such as moratoria more
likely to constitute takings. Id. at 321. The Chief Justice, however, was on the dissenting side
of the Court in Tahoe-Sierra. 535 U.S. at 343. The debate over the correctness of the Court's
rule in Tahoe-Sierra began almost immediately. Compare In Defense of Lake Tahoe, S.F.
CHRON., Apr. 25, 2002, at A22 (arguing that the case "gives clear direction that sensible
planning-which by definition will limit property 'rights'-will survive constitutional
challenges"), with Tahoe Ruling Leaves Owners With Empty Lots, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 25, 2002,
at A17 (chronicling the plight of landowners whose parcels are worth much less undeveloped
than if they were allowed to build on the lots).
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Amendment mandates that private property not "be taken for public use,
without just compensation." 3 Through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, this mandate also applies to the States.' The
Tahoe-SierraCourt, however, recognized these moratoria not as takings but
as something else, something more basic: an essential tool of successful
development.'
Underlying all Fifth Amendment takings cases
is the fundamental
S 6
distinction between physical and regulatory takings. When the government
physically takes property for public use, the Fifth Amendment clearly
requires compensation. Whether a regulation affecting an owner's use of
his land is a "taking" in the constitutional sense, however, involves a factspecific inquiry. Both regulatory takings and physical takings jurisprudence

3. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Although the Constitution does not expressly grant to the
federal government the power of eminent domain, the presence of the just compensation
clause is evidence that the power exists even without an express grant to Congress. See, e.g.,
United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241 (1946). The origins of eminent domain, though
not certain, date at least to biblical times. 1 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.2[1] (Julius
L. Sackman rev. 3d ed., 2002). The power also roots in English history as a prerogative of the
Crown -though there is no comparable requirement that the property be for "public use." 1
id. §§ 1.21, 1.21[5]. One rationale for the power of eminent domain was the principle that the
sovereign retained absolute ownership in all property. 1 id. § 1.13.
4. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236-39 (1897). At issue in
the case was an award of compensation of one dollar to a railroad company when a public
street was constructed on its land. Id. at 232. The Court held the just compensation
requirement of the Fifth Amendment is binding on the states by incorporation through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 239.
5. Tahoe-Sierra,535 U.S. at 337-38. The Court unequivocally supported the type of
moratoria in this case:
[Tihe financial constraints of compensating property owners during a moratorium
may force officials to rush through the planning process or to abandon the practice
altogether. To the extent that communities are forced to abandon using moratoria,
landowners will have incentives to develop their property quickly before a
comprehensive plan can be enacted, thereby fostering inefficient and ill-conceived
growth.
Id. at 339.
6. Id. at 321 (noting that "[t]he text of the Fifth Amendment itself provides a basis for
drawing a distinction between physical takings and regulatory takings").
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation."); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
434-35 (1982) (holding that "when the 'character of the governmental action' . . . is a
permanent physical occupation of property, our cases uniformly have found a taking to the
extent of the occupation") (quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
124 (1978)).
8. As discussed infra in Parts I.B.-C., regulatory takings jurisprudence consists of two
subdivisions: regulations that deny a landowner all economically beneficial use of his
property, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992), and
regulations that only affect or limit the use of a portion of the land, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001). Thus, the facts regarding the nature of the regulation and its
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strive to strike a balance between the rights of individual property owners
and the public. 9 A taking likely occurs when a regulation concentrates
economic injuries disproportionately on a few individuals. 0 The law seeks
some middle ground between avoiding individualized economic burdens
and meeting the goals of necessary land-use planning. The Court's use of a
fact-specific methodology in most regulatory takings cases" has led to a
degree of uncertainty. But per se rules are restrictive, and in a time of
burgeoning development, flexibility is necessary in good land-use planning. 3
Tahoe-Sierraarose after the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA)
enacted two land-use planning ordinances severely restricting development
in the Lake Tahoe basin.'4 Land owners brought suit, claiming that the
restrictions constituted a taking of their property without compensation in
violation of the Fifth Amendment." The basis of the action focused on
TRPA Ordinance 81-5 and Resolution 83-21.' 6 The moratoria, exclusive of
other procedural wrangling by the parties, were in effect for thirty-two
months. 7 The U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada held that the
ordinances constituted categorical takings under the Supreme Court's rule
in Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council.8 It ordered the TRPA to pay
effect on a particular parcel of land are important in determining whether a regulation
constitutes a taking.
9. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617-18.
10. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). In Lucas, for example, the
South Carolina Supreme Court considered the regulation in question a valid exercise of the
State's police power to prevent environmental harms to the public at large. 505 U.S. at 1021.
The regulation, however, specifically prohibited Lucas from developing his lots, for which he
paid $975,000. Id. at 1006-09.
11. But see Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015, where the court used a categorical rule, rather than a
factual inquiry, because the regulation had the same effect as a physical taking.
12. Douglas W. Kmiec, At Last, the Supreme Court Solves the Takings Puzzle, 19 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 147 (1995) (noting that "[miany commentators and practitioners, ranging
from property rights advocates to police power hawks, have viewed the Supreme Court's
takings cases as incoherent, piecemeal, or categorical").
13. The total number of housing units in the United States increased from approximately
88 million in 1980 to 120 million in 2000. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2001 STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, § 20 Constructionand Housing,No. 947 (2001), available

at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/Olstatab/stat-abOl.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2003).
The total value of private nonresidential construction doubled between 1993 and 2000, from
approximately $111 billion in 1993 to $213 billion in 2000. Id. at No. 931.
14. Tahoe-Seirra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,31112 (2002).
15. Id. at 312-14.
16. Id. at 312.
17.

Id.

18. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d
1226, 1245 (D. Nev. 1999). A "categorical taking," at least in the sense used in and after
Lucas, is a "government regulation that interferes with a property owner's use of her property
to the extent that it accomplishes nearly the same result as a direct appropriation." Id. at 1238.
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damages for the thirty-two-month period.' 9 The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the moratoria were a
form of regulation that is widespread and well established, involving only a
portion of the property interest. 2 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that (1)
formulating a general rule is a suitable task for legislatures, not the courts,
and (2) the duration of the regulatory restriction is only one factor
indicating a taking; cases must be decided on a fact-specific basis.21
This Note discusses why the Tahoe-Sierra majority was correct in
concluding that the Lake Tahoe moratoria did not constitute takings. It
begins with a comparison of physical and regulatory takings and traces the
development of these diverging areas of the law. This Note then analyzes
the Supreme Court's primary regulatory takings cases prior to Tahoe-Sierra
in order to illustrate the ongoing land-use regulation debate. Next, this
Note discusses the Court's acceptance of a fact-based inquiry in its
regulatory takings jurisprudence and the effects of such a test on land use
planning. In light of this fact-based approach, this Note explores the
majority and dissenting opinions of Tahoe-Sierra and explains that the
majority was true to the Court's prior regulatory takings law in holding that
the moratoria did not constitute a taking. Finally, this Note proposes that
the majority's approach, which is based on ad hoc factual inquiries, is
essential to good land-use planning and development because flexibility is
needed in the law when local and state authorities draft property
regulations.
I. FUNDAMENTAL DISTINCTIONS IN TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE

A. Physical Takings and the Government's Duty to Compensate
In Loretto v. TeleprompterManhattan CA TV Corp., the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the longstanding rule that the government's permanent physical
The term was used by the Lucas Court to emphasize the absolute requirement of
compensation when a regulation deprives a land owner of all economically beneficial use of
her land. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1026 (1992) (noting that
even the legislature cannot attempt to circumvent this rule by merely reciting noxious-use
justifications).
19. Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1255. Media outlets reported that the plaintiffs
initially sought $27 million in damages. Associated Press, Setback for PropertyRights,(Apr.
23,
2002),
available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/04/23/supremecourt/

main506996.shtml.
20. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764,
782 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that "[i]n reaching this conclusion, we preserve the ability of local
governments to do what they have done for many years-to engage in orderly, land-use
planning through a considered and deliberative process").
21.

Tahoe-Sierra,535 U.S. at 335-37.
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occupation of property constitutes a taking." Loretto involved the practice23
of installing cable television components on the roofs of urban buildings.
Many buildings included cables servicing the tenants of those premises and
crossover" linesC4completing the neighborhood cable network. 24 Prior to
1973, the cable company routinely obtained authorization for the
installations and paid the property owners five percent of the gross revenue
realized from that property.25 But in 1973, a New York statute took effect
prohibiting landlords from interfering with cable installation on their
premises and limiting their demands for compensation for such installation
to one dollar.26 Property owners brought a class action suit seeking just
compensation for the permanent use of the rooftop space.2 7
28
Loretto's holding is consistent with other physical takings cases , but it is
important because it reinforces the rationale behind the Court's physical
takings law. Although the actual size of the physical appropriation was
disputed 9 the majority felt that size did not matter.0 The rationale is best
stated in the classic explanation of the Court's physical takings rule by
Justice Marshall: "[w]hen the 'character of the governmental action'... is a
permanent physical occupation of property, our cases uniformly have found
a taking to the extent of the occupation, without regard to whether the
action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic
impact on the owner."31 Thus, because a permanent physical taking
22. 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982). The Court found that the installation of cable
equipment "involved a direct physical attachment of plates, boxes, wires, bolts, and screws to
the building, completely occupying space immediately above and upon the roof and along the
building's exterior wall." Id. at 438.
23. Id. at 421-22.
24. Id. at 422.
25. Id. at 423.
26. Id. at 423-24. The purpose of the statute was to facilitate tenant access to cable
television and reduce property owners' ability to thwart the development of cable television,
"which has important educational and community benefits." Id. at 423,425. The State Cable
Commission ruled that landlords were only entitled to one dollar compensation because that
was what they would have received if the property were condemned pursuant to New York
law. Id. at 423-24.
27. Id. at 424.
28. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (holding that government use
of private airspace to approach a government airport is a taking).
29. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 442-43 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun argued
in his dissent that the physical space "taken" amounted to less than "one-eighth of a cubic
foot of space" and thus was not of constitutional significance. Id. at 443. Writing for the
Court, Justice Marshall disagreed and argued that the size of the space taken was much larger,
though the actual size of the area taken was not clear in the record. Id. at 438 n.16.
30. Id. (noting that "[i]n any event, these facts are not critical: whether the installation is
a taking does not depend on whether the volume of space it occupies is bigger than a
breadbox").
31. Id. at 434-35.
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destroys the property rights retained by the land owner, compensation is
always due.32
The Court also has long recognized the government's duty to compensate
for temporaryphysical seizures of property.33 In UnitedStates v. Pewee Coal
Co., the United States seized and operated a coal mine for a temporary
period in order to avoid a coal miners' strike.34 The Court held that even
though the seizure was temporary, it constituted a taking and required

compensation.

35

B. Regulatory Takings: A Per Se Rule
A land-use regulation that is not a physical taking may also be considered
a taking in limited circumstances; Justice Holmes was first to recognize that
"while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too
far it will be recognized as a taking., 36 The issue remains whether a
regulation has gone "too far." This question was addressed at length in3
37
This contentious case 1
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.

32. Id. at 435-36. Justice Marshall continued:
To the extent that the government permanently occupies physical property, it
effectively destroys [the rights to possess, use, and dispose of it]. First, the owner
has no right to possess the occupied space himself, and also has no power to exclude
the occupier from possession and use of the space .... Second, the permanent
physical occupation of property forever denies the owner any power to control the
use of the property; he not only cannot exclude others, but can make no
nonpossessory use of the property ....Finally, even though the owner may retain
the bare legal right to dispose of the occupied space by transfer or sale, the
permanent occupation of that space by a stranger will ordinarily empty the right of
any value, since the purchaser will also be unable to make any use of the property.
Id. at 435-36.
33. United States v. Pewee Coal Co., Inc., 341 U.S. 114, 115-17 (1951).
34. Id. at 115. The government possessed and operated the mine from May 1 to October
12, 1943. Id.
35. Id. The Court ruled that a taking had clearly occurred, given the circumstances:
[The Government] required mine officials to agree to conduct operations as agents
for the Government; required the American flag to be flown at every mine; required
placards reading "United States Property!" to be posted on the premises; and
appealed to the miners to dig coal for the United States as a public duty.
Id. at 116. The Court agreed with the Court of Federal Claims regarding damages, the
amount of which was set at $2241.26. Id. at 117. Justice Reed, concurring, noted the difficulty
inherent in a temporary taking, "especially in the fixing of the just compensation." Id. at 119
(Reed, J., concurring). Although Justice Reed was addressing physical takings, his
recognition of the valuation problems with temporary takings foreshadows one of the
contentious points in temporary regulatory takings cases.
36. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); see also Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,1014, (1992) (explaining that before Justice Holmes's
opinion in Mahon, "it was generally thought that the Takings Clause reached only a 'direct
appropriation' of property").
37. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006.
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reiterated the proposition that a regulation denying all economically
beneficial or productive use of property constitutes a taking." The State can
avoid paying compensation only if the landowner's title did not include the
proscribed uses when he acquired it. 40 The justification for this categorical
rule rests on the practical and economic equivalence of physical
appropriations and elimination of all beneficial use of land.'
Thus, when the South Carolina Legislature enacted the Beachfront
Management Act in 1988, two years after David Lucas paid $975,000 for
residential property on the Isle of Palms, thereby precluding Lucas from
building any permanent structures on his parcels, the State had effectively
taken Lucas's property.4 The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the
Beachfront Management Act was a valid exercise of the State's police
power to control possible harm to the public interest "occasioned" by
Lucas's use of his land. 43 The U.S. Supreme Court conceded that no
compensation would be required for a prohibition against "harmful or
noxious uses," that is, against a nuisance. 4 But the Just Compensation

Clause cannot be avoided with a simple claim of "nuisance. 45 Absent some
"background principles" in state property law placing nuisance restrictions
on the property, a regulation denying all economically beneficial use of the
46
property constitutes a taking and demands compensation.
38. Lucas was the result of a fractured Court. Justice Scalia wrote the opinion of the
Court, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, and Thomas joined.
Id. at 1005. Justice Kennedy concurred. Id. at 1032. Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens
filed dissenting opinions. Id. at 1036, 1061. Justice Souter felt the case should have been
dismissed because certiorari was improvidently granted. Id. at 1076.
39. Id. at 1015.
40. Id. at 1027.
41. Id. at 1017.
42. Id. at 1006-07. The case was remanded to allow the State to show that the
Beachfront Management Act did not constitute a taking of Lucas's property under the
common law nuisance doctrine. Id. at 1031-32. South Carolina could not make this showing,
notes Kmiec, supra note 12, at 151 n.27. The State settled with Mr. Lucas for $425,000 for
each of his two lots plus $725,000 for interest, attorneys' fees, and costs. Id. The State then
sold the lots to a developer for $785,000. Id. South Carolina ultimately lost $790,000 on the
transaction.
43. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1020-21.
44. Id. at 1022.
45. Id. at 1026. The Court was suspicious of this pretext:
[T]he legislature's recitation of a noxious-use justification cannot be the basis for
departing from our categorical rule that total regulatory takings must be
compensated. If it were, departure would virtually always be allowed. The South
Carolina Supreme Court's approach would essentially nullify [our] affirmation of
limits to the noncompensable exercise of the police power.
Id.
46. Id. at 1029. These "background principles," broadly defined, are inherent limitations
in the land owner's title arising under the state's police power. See id. at 1027. One such
limitation is the prohibition against "harmful or noxious uses"-nuisances-by which a land-
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C. Regulatory Takings: A FactualApproach

One can imagine many circumstances in which a regulation does not
deprive a land owner of all economically beneficial use of his property. 4 A
landmark preservation ordinance, for example, that prohibits certain types
of property development may affect the value of that property without
rendering it valueless to the owner. 48 New York City enacted such a law in
1965.49 The purpose of the law was to protect historic buildings and
neighborhoods from demolition.5 0 The result, in many circumstances,
restricted what property owners could do to their property." This type of
regulation, however, is not necessarily a taking.52
use regulation "substantially advances legitimate state interests." Id. at 1023-24 (quoting
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 438 U.S. 825,834 (1987)). The Lucas Court noted that
a long history of use of similar parcels may provide evidence that a regulatory prohibition
lacks any common-law basis, and that it "seems unlikely that common-law principles would
have prevented the erection of any habitable or productive improvements on petitioner's
land." Id. at 1031. On remand, South Carolina was required to show that the limitations in
Mr. Lucas's title were based on common-law principles of nuisance and property law. Id. The
State failed to make such a showing. See supra note 42. One scholar argues that reliance on
background principles is the proper analysis. See Kmiec, supra note 12, at 152. If the
legislature alone determined what rights are inherent in title, without any reference to the
common law, it would be all too easy to avoid paying compensation for regulatory
prohibitions. Id. at 153. State courts, rather, are in the best position to determine the
background principles of property law as they subtly change over time. Id. at 154. The
federal courts, then, can use these principles in adjudicating a regulatory takings claim. Id.
47. Zoning laws provide an example. 12 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL
PROPERTY § 79C.01 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2000) (noting that in Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co. the Supreme Court "held that a comprehensive municipal zoning
ordinance on its face is a proper exercise of the police power and does not constitute an
unconstitutional deprivation of private property"). There are also judicially imposed
limitations, e.g., the law of nuisance, and privately imposed restrictions such as covenants,
equitable servitudes, and easements. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1023-24 (noting that the law of
nuisance is a traditional judicial limitation on the use of property); 9 POWELL, supra § 60.01[2]
(stating that "[a] covenant is an agreement or promise of two or more parties that something
is done, will be done, or will not be done") (emphasis added); 9 id. § 60.01[4] (noting that
equitable courts expanded enforcement of covenants, hence "equitable servitudes"); 4 id. §
34.02[1]-[2] (explaining that easements alter the pre-existing property rights in land).
48. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 107, 131 (1978)
("[A]ppellants, focusing on the character and impact of the New York City law, argue that it
effects a 'taking' because its operation has significantly diminished the value of the Terminal
site.").
49. Id. at 108-09.
50. Id. at 109. The underlying rationale of the ordinance sought to promote the beauty,
economy, and tourism of the city by preserving its historic areas and landmarks. Id.
51. Id. at 111 (stating that "[flinal designation as a landmark results in restrictions upon
the property owner's options concerning use of the landmark site"). Landmark designation
and the resulting controversies between developers and those who would save historic
structures continue to the present time. See, e.g., It's Battle Stations on Bowery, N.Y. POST,
Aug. 5,2002, at I (chronicling the fight over the Bowery Savings Bank on Manhattan's Lower
East Side); Hilarie M. Sheets, CapturingDestruction at the End of the Track, NEWSDAY, June
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In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, the owners of

Grand Central Terminal challenged the New York City landmark
law.53 The Supreme Court held that the regulation was not a
preservation
14

taking, noting that "it is not literally accurate to say that [the owners] have
rights."55 The parcel itself
been denied all use of even those pre-existing ...
remained able to earn a reasonable return, and the owners could still
"transfer" the development rights (those rights pertaining to the Terminal
site abrogated by the ordinance) to other parcels in the area.56 The Court
also held that both the supposed diminution in value of the terminal and the
regulation's interference with investment-backed expectations were factors
in finding a taking, but neither was dispositive
In Penn Central,the Terminal owners planned to build an office tower
above the existing facade, but the city landmark commission denied their
proposals.5" Penn Central Transportation Co. filed suit in the New York
14,2002, at B25 (explaining the continuing controversy over the demolition of Penn Station in
1963-prior to the Landmark Preservation Law-to make way for Madison Square Garden).
52. Penn Central,438 U.S. at 138 (holding that the regulations allowed reasonable uses of
the property).
53. Id. at 116, 119. Owned by Penn Central Transportation Co. and still in use as a
railroad station, the terminal was one of the buildings designated as a landmark under the
ordinance. Id. at 115-16. The building "is regarded not only as providing an ingenious
engineering solution to the problems presented by urban railroad stations, but also as a
magnificent example of the French beaux-arts style." Id.
54. Penn Central,438 U.S. at 138.
55. Id. at 137. The court continued:
Their ability to use these rights has not been abrogated; they are made transferable
to at least eight parcels in the vicinity of the Terminal, one or two of which have
been found suitable for the construction of new office buildings. Although
appellants and others have argued that New York City's transferable developmentrights program is far from ideal, the New York courts here supportably found that,
at least in the case of the Terminal, the rights afforded are valuable. While these
rights may well not have constituted "just compensation" if a "taking" had occurred,
the rights nevertheless undoubtedly mitigate whatever financial burdens the law has
imposed on appellants and, for that reason, are to be taken into account in
considering the impact of regulation.
Id.
56. Id. at 129. Under the preservation ordinance, owners who had not fully developed
their property could transfer their development rights to neighboring parcels. Id. at 113-14.
57. Id. at 124, 131. Investment-backed expectations focus on "the specific uses for the
subject property that were contemplated by the property owner when the property was
acquired." 13 POWELL, supra note 47, § 79F.05[4][a][ii][B]. These expectations must be
reasonable in relation to the purchase price. 13 id. In addition, the expectations must be
further qualified when the property is located in a heavily regulated area or where regulations
are expected to change over time. 13 id.
58. Penn Central,438 U.S. at 116. The developers had two proposals, one for a fifty-fivestory building and one for a fifty-three-story tower. Id.at 116-17. The second proposal was
more daring than the first, calling for demolition of a portion of the Terminal, including the
famous 42nd Street facade. Id. at 117. The commission dismissed the second proposal
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Supreme Court claiming that the preservation ordinance constituted a
taking by preventing construction on the property.59 The trial court found a
taking, but the appellate division reversed, 6° and the U.S. Supreme Court
affirmed.61
With respect to investment-backed expectations, the Court has
consistently recognized that "[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some
extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying
for every such change in the general law. ,62 The classic land-use regulations
61
adversely affecting property values are zoning laws. Zoning laws, upheld
64
since Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., "have been viewed as
permissible governmental action even when prohibitingthe most beneficial
use of the property."65 But zoning laws often affect property differently than

summarily, noting that "[t]o protect a Landmark, one does not tear it down. To perpetuate its
architectural features, one does not strip them off." Id. (citation omitted). The first proposal,
that of merely balancing an office tower on top of the terminal, received greater consideration
but was still denied:
to balance a 55-story office tower above a flamboyant Beaux-Arts facade seems
nothing more than an aesthetic joke. Quite simply, the tower would overwhelm the
Terminal by its sheer mass. The "addition" would be four times as high as the
existing structure and would reduce the Landmark itself to the status of a curiosity.
Landmarks cannot be divorced from their settings -particularly when the setting is
a dramatic and integral part of the original concept. The Terminal, in its setting, is a
great example of urban design. Such examples are not so plentiful in New York
City that we can afford to lose any of the few we have. And we must preserve them
in a meaningful way-with alterations and additions of such character, scale,
materials and mass as will protect, enhance and perpetuate the original design
rather than overwhelm it.
Id. at 117-18 (citation omitted).
59. Id. at 119.
Aside from submitting additional plans for the commission's
consideration, Penn Central had no choice but to file a takings claim. Id. at 118-19. Because
the site was tax-exempt, "suitable for its present and many future uses, and was not the
subject of a contract of sale, there were no further administrative remedies available." Id. at
118.
60. Id. at 119. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was no
taking because the City did not assume control of the site. Id. at 120-21. Specifically, the
court concluded that, (1) the landmark law did not prohibit the use for which the building was
employed; (2) Penn Central failed to show that it could not earn a reasonable return; (3) even
though the Terminal operated at a loss (or failed to earn a reasonable profit), some of the
income from Penn Central's other real estate holdings in the area must be imputed to the
Terminal site; and (4) the transferability of the development rights above the Terminal were
extremely valuable. Id. at 121-22.
61. Id. at 138.
62. Id. at 124 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,413 (1922)).
63. Id. at 125.
64. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
65. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125 (emphasis added).
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a regulation challenged as a taking.66 Moreover, a regulation that prohibits
a beneficial use of property and causes significant harm need not be a
taking. 6' Thus, Penn Central reaffirms the Court's land-use planning
jurisprudence and applies those rules to regulatory actions that may be
challenged as takings.
The Supreme Court's most recent foray, prior to Tahoe-Sierra,into the
regulatory takings arena was Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, which reiterated
that the categorical rule of Lucas does not apply to parcels that retain some
value. 68 In 1959, Mr. Palazzolo purchased three undeveloped parcels of land
in Westerly, Rhode Island, with the intention of subdividing the parcels into
eighty lots. 69 Between the purchase date and 1966, the State denied all
attempts to develop the property. 7 In 1971, Rhode Island created the
Coastal Resources Management Council to protect the state's shoreline.7'
Palazzolo resumed his efforts to develop the property in 1983.72 The
Council denied his applications, and Palazzolo filed an inverse
condemnation suit claiming that the State had taken his property without
just compensation.73
66. See id. (stating that "[z]oning laws generally do not affect existing uses of real
property, but 'taking' challenges have also been held to be without merit in a wide variety of
situations when the challenged governmental actions prohibited a beneficial use to which
individual parcels had previously been devoted and thus caused substantial individualized
harm").
67. Id. at 125-26 (citing Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928)) (holding that the
destruction of one type of property (trees) to save another type that, "in the judgment of the
legislature," is more important, is not a taking requiring compensation).
68. Palazzolo, 535 U.S. 606, 631-32 (2001).
69. Id. at 613. Mr. Palazzolo formed Shore Gardens, Inc. (SGI) with business associates
for the purpose of purchasing and holding the property. Id. The company's first development
proposal included seventy-four lots over approximately twenty acres. Id.
70. Id. at 613-14. Because most of the land consisted of salt marsh and was subject to
tidal flooding, soil fill was required, in some places as much as six feet, before any significant
development could take place. Id. The first application, in 1962, was denied by the Rhode
Island Division of Harbors and Rivers for "lack of essential information." Id. at 614. The
Rhode Island Department of Natural Resources denied the second and third applications
after initial approval was withdrawn, and SGI did not appeal these denials. Id.
71. Id. The Council promulgated regulations that severely limited development on
"coastal wetlands" such as Palazzolo's. Id.
72. Id. Palazzolo, rather than SGI, spearheaded the development efforts in the 1980s
because SGI's corporate charter had been revoked for failure to pay taxes. Id. As a matter of
law, then, Palazzolo became the sole title holder to the property. Id. This was a significant
issue in both the state courts and the Supreme Court. The State argued that with this change
in title, Palazzolo took title subject to the existing coastal wetlands regulations. See Palazzolo
v. State, 746 A.2d 707, 716 (R.I. 2000). While the Rhode Island courts agreed, the Supreme
Court did not. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 616, 626-30. This issue, however, is not critically
important to the issues in Lake Tahoe.
73. Palazzolo,533 U.S. at 615-16. An inverse condemnation suit is "an action brought by
a property owner for compensation from a governmental entity that has taken the owner's
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Palazzolo relied on Lucas, arguing that the Council's actions had deprived
him of all "economically beneficial use" of his land. 74 This argument was
problematic at best because the Rhode Island Supreme Court accepted the
trial court's finding that Palazzolo's parcel retained $200,000 in
development value." Before the U.S. Supreme Court, Palazzolo accepted
this finding, but he continued to maintain that the regulation constituted 76a
total taking under Lucas because he was left with "a few crumbs of value.,
The Supreme Court disagreed, noting that "[a] regulation permitting a
landowner to build a substantial residence on an 18-acre parcel does not
leave the property 'economically idle.' 7 7 In the end, the Court held that if
land retains some value, even if only on a portion of the tract, there is no
taking. 8
Justice O'Connor's concurrence supplied the most relevant part of
Palazzolo,for the purpose of an analysis of Tahoe-Sierra,where she stated,
"Penn Centraldoes not supply mathematically precise variables, but instead
provides important guideposts that lead to the ultimate determination
whether just compensation is required."'7 9 Justice O'Connor argued that the
Rhode Island Supreme Court, in denying Palazzolo's claim, relied too
heavily on the investment-backed expectations prong of Penn Central.80 She
reasoned that the State would become too powerful if investment-backed
expectations were given special prominence. 8' These expectations are only
property without bringing formal condemnation proceedings." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
287 (7th ed. 1999).
74. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 615-16. Palazzolo sought damages of $3,150,000 based on the
appraised value of his planned seventy-four-lot subdivision. Id. at 616.
75. Id. (citing Palazzolo, 746 A.2d at 715).
76. Id. at 630-31 (citing Brief for Petitioner at 37).
77. Id. at 631 (quoting Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019
(1992)).
78. Id. at 630-32. The case was remanded for consideration of Palazzolo's Penn Central
claim: whether the regulations interfered with his investment-backed expectations. Id. at 632.
Because Palazzolo took title from SGI in 1978, the Rhode Island Courts held that he did so
with notice of the restrictions. Palazzolo,746 A.2d at 716-17. Thus the Penn Central test was
not needed, as he took title with no expectations of development. See supra note 72. The
Supreme Court reversed this portion of the Rhode Island courts' holdings, which necessitates
an analysis under Penn Central. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 616, 626-30. As of the date of this
writing, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has remanded the case to the trial court for such an
analysis. Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 785 A.2d 561 (R.I. 2001).
79. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 632, 634 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 634. In addition, Justice O'Connor noted that "the state of regulatory affairs at
the time of acquisition is not the only factor that may determine the extent of investmentbacked expectations." Id. The Court, she said, has never denied a takings claim solely
because the land owner lacked a personal investment in the land acquired after the enactment
of a restrictive regulation. Id. at 634-35. Instead, the courts must focus on "those
circumstances which are probative of what fairness requires in a given case." Id. at 635.
81. Id. at 635 (noting that the State could "redefine property rights upon passage of
title").
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one part of the analysis; "[t]he temptation to adopt what amount to per se
rules in either direction must be resisted. 8 2 It is precisely this approach that
was reaffirmed in Tahoe-Sierra.
D. Regulatory Takings: Temporary Restrictions on Property Use
The method used to determine whether a regulation amounts to a
permanent taking is similar to that used in allegations of temporary
takings.83 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in FirstEnglish
EvangelicalLutheran Church of Glendalev. County of Los Angeles, argued
that temporary takings "are not different in kind from permanent takings,
for which the Constitution clearly requires compensation."M The Chief
Justice's argument is important to the facts of Tahoe-Sierra because
moratoria are inherently temporary. 85
The question in FirstEnglish was whether compensation is required for86
the period prior to the time a court declares the regulation a taking.
Compensation is required both for temporary physical takings 87 and in
situations where a regulation denies an owner all economically beneficial
use of his land. 8 FirstEnglish, like the cases before it, did not set any per se
standards.89

82. Id. at 636. Justice O'Connor insisted that "[tjhe Takings Clause requires careful
examination and weighing of all the relevant circumstances in this context." Id.
83. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987). The Chief Justice noted that the "Fifth Amendment's just
compensation provision is 'designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole."' Id. at 318-19 (citation omitted). Justice Stevens was skeptical that permanent and
temporary regulatory takings were the same and dissented: "[u]ntil today, we have repeatedly
rejected the notion that all temporary diminutions in the value of property automatically
activate the compensation requirement of the Takings Clause." Id. at 332. Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court in Tahoe-Sierra. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,306 (2002).
84. First English, 482 U.S. at 318. This idea was not adopted by the majority in TahoeSierra. See 535 U.S. at 324.
85. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1026 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "moratorium" as a
"postponement," "delay," or "suspension").
86. First English, 482 U.S. at 306-07. This narrow issue allowed the Tahoe-Sierra Court
to find that the temporary takings in the case before it did not require compensation. TahoeSierra, 535 U.S. at 328 (noting that "it is important to recognize that we did not address in
[First English] the quite different and logically prior question whether the temporary
regulation at issue had in fact constituted a taking").
87. United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115-17 (1951).
88. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992). First English
involved a regulation that deprived the property owner of all use of his land, as in Lucas. First
English, 482 U.S. at 322.
89. The Court was careful to limit its holding to the question presented. Foreshadowing
the debate in Tahoe-Sierra,the Court stated,
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First English Evangelical Lutheran Church owned a twenty-one-acre
parcel in the Angeles National Forest that it used as a campground. 9
Located along Mill Creek, buildings stood on twelve acres of flat land. 9' In
1978, significant flooding destroyed the campground. 92 The County of Los
Angeles responded to the flood by adopting Interim Ordinance No. 11,855
in January 1979, which prohibited any construction on the Church's land. 93
The Church immediately filed a complaint claiming that the ordinance
denied it all use of the land; 94 the California courts denied its claim.95
The Supreme Court reversed, noting that the merits of the Church's
takings claim had not yet been addressed, and the prohibition faced by the
Church was substantial.96 The fact that the ordinance had not been
invalidated as a taking was irrelevant to the compensation issue. 97 The
We... do not deal with the quite different questions that would arise in the case of
normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances,
variances, and the like which are not before us. We realize that even our present
holding will undoubtedly lessen to some extent the freedom and flexibility of landuse planners and governing bodies of municipal corporations when enacting landuse regulations.
FirstEnglish, 482 U.S. at 321.
90. Id. at 307. The campground was known as "Lutherglen" and was used as a retreat
and recreation area for handicapped children. Id.
91. Id. Lutherglen consisted of a dining hall, two bunkhouses, a caretaker's lodge, an
outdoor chapel, and a footbridge across the creek. Id.
92. Id. The flooding was precipitated by a forest fire upstream in 1977, which created a
significant flood hazard. Id.
93. Id. The ordinance was for the "immediate preservation of the public health and
safety." Id. (citation omitted).
94. Id. at 308. The Church also blamed the county and its Flood Control District for the
flood hazards created upstream and sought to recover in inverse condemnation and in tort for
the Flood Control District's cloud seeding during the storm that led to the flood. Id.
95. Id. at 309. The California courts relied primarily on Agins v. City of Tiburon, 598
P.2d 25 (Cal. 1979), affd on othergrounds,447 U.S. 255 (1980). FirstEnglish,482 U.S. at 30809. Agins held that a landowner cannot seek recovery by an inverse condemnation suit based
solely on a regulatory taking; instead, the landowner must first seek to have the regulation
invalidated. Agins, 598 P.2d at 29-31. But the U.S. Supreme Court found the question ripe
for review in First English:
Our cases have also required that one seeking compensation must "seek
compensation through the procedures the State has provided for doing so" before
the claim is ripe for review. It is clear that appellant met this requirement. Having
assumed that a taking occurred, the California court's dismissal of the action
establishes that "the inverse condemnation procedure is unavailable .... " The
compensation claim is accordingly ripe for our consideration.
FirstEnglish, 482 U.S. at 312 n.6 (citations omitted).
96. FirstEnglish,482 U.S. at 319. The California courts never reached the merits of the
case because of their reliance on Agins. See supra note 95. The California Supreme Court
denied review in 1985, effectively extending the ban on development for six years. See First
English, 482 U.S. at 319.
97. FirstEnglish, 482 U.S. at 320-21. This is because "[o]nce a court determines that a
taking has occurred, the government retains the whole range of options already available -
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Court• noted •that
• the
98 valuation of property taken is to be calculated as of the
time of restriction. Because the Los Angeles County ordinance denied the
Church all use of its property for a prolonged period of time, mere
invalidation of the ordinance without compensation for the intervening time
was insufficient. 99 The Court stopped short of a bright-line regulatory
takings rule, however, noting in dictum that depreciation in value due to
mere enactment of regulatory prohibitions is not chargeable to the
government.19
II. TAHOE-SIERRA: CONTINUITY OR RADICAL CHANGE?
Before Lucas, First English, or Palazzolo reached the Supreme Court,
449 individual and corporate plaintiffs began fighting for just compensation
based on the regulatory actions of the TRPA.' 1 Tahoe-Sierratraveled its
long and winding journey to the Supreme Court while the Court was still
shaping its regulatory takings jurisprudence. '°2 The facts of the case,
although analogous to Penn Central,Palazzolo, and FirstEnglish in part,
raised new issues.0 3 It is appropriate, then, to look to Tahoe-Sierraas the
most recent culmination of the Court's regulatory takings law.
A. Good Planningor Theft?: The Regulations that Precipitatedan
Eighteen-Year Battle

Swift development began creating problems in the Lake Tahoe basin as
early as the 1960s. 4 The lake's formerly deep blue color °5 has deteriorated
amendment of the regulation, withdrawal of the invalidated regulation, or exercise of eminent
domain." Id. at 321. The Court also noted that "no subsequent action by the government can
relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during which the taking was
effective."
98. Id.
99. Id. at 322. The case was remanded for consideration of the valuation question. Id.
100. Id. at 320.
101. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d
1226, 1229 (D. Nev. 1999). The plaintiffs-individuals, corporations, partnerships, and
nonprofit organizations-all owned property in the Lake Tahoe Basin. Id. The complaint in
this case was filed on June 25, 1984, but the trial did not begin until December 1, 1998. Id. at
1229, 1236.
102. See id. at 1229. The trial court noted that in the fourteen and one-half years of
litigation before trial, the case resulted in three opinions from the Ninth Circuit, five
published district court opinions, and many more unpublished orders. Id. The action was
originally filed in two parts: one by California plaintiffs in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California, another by the Nevada plaintiffs in the District of Nevada,
where they were consolidated in 1992. Id. at 1236. The numerous opinions and orders served
mainly to narrow the issues for trial and to dispose of claims that were time-barred or moot.
See id. at 1237-38.
103. See supra Parts I.C.-D.
104. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 307
(2002). The California Supreme Court, referencing the development around Lake Tahoe,
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over the decades." 6 Not only has the lake's clarity decreased, but the water
has almost turned green.1 O The California and Nevada legislatures, along
with the federal government, created the TRPA in 1968 to halt (and
hopefully reverse) this process.'
The stated purpose of the TRPA is "to
coordinate and regulate development in the Basin and to conserve its

noted nearly thirty years ago that "the region's natural wealth contains the virus of its
ultimate impoverishment." Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1232 (quoting People ex rel.
Younger v. County of El Dorado, 487 P.2d 1193-94 (Cal. 1971)). The following facts illustrate
the development in the Lake Tahoe Basin:
Most of the development and urbanization has occurred since the 1960's [sic],
during and following the Squaw Valley Winter Olympics. Between 1960 and 1990,
the Basin's population multiplied fivefold. Most of that population boom- about 80
percent-ended up on the California side. By 1991 the Basin held some 24,500
single-family homes, 14,100 multi-family homes, 12,000 tourist accommodations
units, and 2,000 campground units. There are some 20 developed towns, and casino
gaming areas are located at both north and south ends of the Lake. The Basin
continues to be an extremely popular year-round destination for visitors seeking
water sports, gaming, hiking, sailing, fishing, and many other forms of recreation.
The year round resident population of [sic] is dwarfed by the estimated three million
visitors a year.
Tahoe
Center
for
a
Sustainable Future,
The
Lake
Tahoe Basin, at
http://ceres.ca.govltcsf/PresidentialEvent/laketahoe.html (last updated June 4, 1997).
105. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 307 (noting that "Lake Tahoe's exceptional clarity is
attributed to the absence of algae that obscures the waters of most other lakes").
106. Id. While the record does not reveal the exact level of deterioration, TRPA officials
are hopeful that the problem is beginning to turn around. See, e.g., Glen Martin, Unclear If
Tahoe Clarityon Mend; 2001 Improvement Could Be Anomaly, S.F. CHRON., June 17,2002, at
B1. The Secchi disc, a small white disc used to measure water visibility, could be seen at a
depth of twenty-three meters in 2001, three meters deeper than in 2000. Id. This could simply
be the result of 2001's drought, but officials at the TRPA are optimistic that water quality is
improving. Id. The goal is a return to visibility down to 29.6 meters, which was the level in
the 1970s. Id. Notwithstanding the recent improvement, reaching the goal of 29.6 meters
could still take years, or decades. Id.
107. Tahoe-Sierra,535 U.S. at 308. The Court adopted the findings of the district court,
noting that "[t]he upsurge of development in the area has caused 'increased nutrient loading
of the lake largely because of the increase in impervious coverage of land in the Basin
resulting from that development."' Id. (quoting Tahoe-Sierra,34 F. Supp. 2d at 1231). The
Court recounted the district court's findings:
"Impervious coverage-such as asphalt, concrete, buildings, and even packed dirtprevents precipitation from being absorbed by the soil. Instead, the water is
gathered and concentrated by such coverage. Larger amounts of water flowing off a
driveway or a roof have more erosive force than scattered raindrops falling over a
dispersed area-especially one covered with indigenous vegetation, which softens
the impact of the raindrops themselves." Given this trend, the District Court
predicted that "unless the process is stopped, the lake will lose its clarity and its
trademark blue color, becoming green and opaque for eternity."
Id. (quoting Tahoe-Sierra,34 F. Supp. 2d at 1231).
108. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Compact, Pub. L. No. 91-148, 83 Stat. 360 (1969).
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natural resources."'0 9 Specifically, the TRPA divides land into "land
capability districts" based on the land's potential for runoff,"0 places
development restrictions on those parcels according to their district
designation, and creates water quality plans to comply with the Clean Water
Act.'il
1. The TRPA Classifies Land Into Land-CapabilityDistricts
In 1972, the TRPA began in earnest its coordination of the development
in the Basin." 2 The TRPA's primary business was to set standards for
preserving the lake."3 To this end, the TRPA enacted Ordinance No. 4,
which classified land in the Basin into "land capability districts" numbered
one through seven.' 4 The TRPA designated the most sensitive areas, land
capability districts one through three, as Stream Environment Zones
(SEZs), and less environmentally-fragile parcels received higher numbers."'
A level one or level two designation was a virtual death knell to the
property's development capacity; in those cases, only one percent of the
land could be covered by "impervious coverage.""16 "Impervious
coverage" -natural land covered by unnatural creations such as parking lots
or homes-causes significantly more runoff, which lies at the root of the
lake's clarity problems." 7

109. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 394
(1979).
110. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 309. Focused restrictions on "high hazard" areas are
essential to solving the lake's water clarity problems. Id. at 308. These "high hazard" areas
consist of "areas in the Basin that have steeper slopes [that] produce more runoff" and "areas
near streams or wetlands ...because, in their natural state, they act as filters for much of the
debris that runoff carries." Id. These areas have been the focus of the most onerous
development restrictions. Id. at 308-09.
111. Id. at 309-10. The compact creating the TRPA underwent significant revisions in
1980. Id. These revisions "redefined the structure, functions, and voting procedures" and in
an attempt to remedy the earlier ineffectiveness of the agency. Id. at 310.
112. Tahoe-Sierra,34 F. Supp. 2d at 1232. Coordination was needed because the land in
the Basin encompasses two states, five counties, multiple municipalities, and U.S. government
property owned by the U.S. Forest Service. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. These designations, derived from the so-called "Bailey system," were based on
the steepness of the land, flood hazards, water tables, soil drainage, landslides, the amount
and type of flora and fauna, and erodibility. Id.
115. Id. at 1231-32.
116. Id.
117. Id. Impervious coverage causes runoff to reach the Lake because, as the natural
environment is replaced by unnatural changes, the ground is no longer able to filter runoff
before it reaches the water's edge. Id. at 1231. Stream Environment Zones act as natural
filters, and when replaced by impervious coverage, cannot fulfill this function. Id.
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2. The TRPA is Forced to Enact Two Development Moratoria
Despite the TRPA's efforts, Ordinance No. 4 allowed too many

exceptions and as a result, failed to solve many problems.I8 In response,
California and Nevada adopted a major overhaul of the TRPA in 1980, and
the revamped TRPA began tightening restrictions on development." 9 On
June 25, 1981, the TRPA enacted the first moratorium at issue in TahoeSierra: Ordinance 81-5.2° Ordinance 81-5 prohibited nearly all residential
construction and completely banned commercial construction on SEZs and
land capability districts 1-3 until the TRPA could promulgate a more
comprehensive regional plan."' Unable to adopt the plan within the period
prescribed by its enabling statute, the TRPA enacted a companion
moratorium, Ordinance 83-21.122 Ordinance 83-21 called for a complete halt
to all project reviews and proposals.123 The TRPA adopted its regional plan
in April 1984, and Ordinance 83-21 expired. 124 Many of the provisions
of
125
months.
thirty-two
of
period
a
for
effect
in
remained
81-5
Ordinance

118. Id. at 1233. The district court explained that Ordinance No. 4 did not significantly
limit residential building and noted that the State of California was so dissatisfied with the
TRPA's progress that it withdrew its funding from the TRPA and began imposing stricter
standards on the California side of the lake. Id.
119. Id. First, the TRPA defined the word "project" to include "an activity undertaken by
any person, including any public agency, if the activity may substantially affect the land, water,
air, space or any other natural resources of the region." Id. (citation omitted). Second, the
reorganization of the TRPA required that the TRPA itself approve any "projects." Id. For
the most part, this meant that prior to any new home construction on class 1-3 and SEZ lands,
landowners were required to obtain a permit from the TRPA. Id.
120. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 533 U.S. 302,311
(2002). The district court construed the ordinance as prohibiting "construction or other
activity that involved the removal of vegetation or the creation of land coverage on all SEZ
lands [in both California and Nevada], as well as on class 1, 2, and 3 lands in California."
Tahoe-Sierra,34 F. Supp. 2d at 1233-35.
121. Tahoe-Sierra,34 F. Supp. 2d at 1233-34. The Compact that overhauled the TRPA in
1980 required this comprehensive plan, and required the TRPA to adopt certain
environmental standards within eighteen months of the 1980 overhaul and mechanisms to
enforce those standards within one year of their adoption. Id. at 1233.
122. Id. at 1235.
123. Id. The restrictions were greater in California. See supra note 120. The State of
California sought an injunction against the TRPA's comprehensive plan the day of its
adoption in 1984. Tahoe-Sierra,535 U.S. at 312. The district court granted this injunction,
which remained in force for three more years, yet the Supreme Court did not consider the
injunction in its analysis. Id.
124. Tahoe-Sierra,34 F. Supp. 2d at 1236.
125. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 312. The majority viewed the moratoria as lasting only
thirty-two months, while the dissenting justices argued that the time during which the
preliminary injunction was in force should be added to the thirty-two month period. Id. at
313-14, 313 n.8.
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3. Lake Tahoe Basin Property Owners Cry Foul
Basin property owners filed complaints against the TRPA, individual
members of its Board, and the States of Nevada and California seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief for their claim that the moratoria
constituted a taking.'26 The plaintiffs also claimed that they were charged
assessments on their land for services that were rendered useless by the
moratoria.'27 At first, the plaintiffs were unsuccessful, but the Ninth Circuit
allowed some of the takings claims to survive on remand.'28 After a bench
trial, the district court found that the moratoria did result in takings and
ordered compensation.' 9 The court of appeals reversed.3
B. The Supreme Court Eschews a CategoricalRule
In one sense, the Tahoe-Sierramajority opinion seemed merely to solidify
prior regulatory takings jurisprudence. At the same time, the Court made
some powerful statements regarding the power of governments -or quasigovernmental units like the TRPA-to tinker with significant property
rights in the name of land-use planning. Justice Stevens, writing for six
members of the Court, began by quoting Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion in Palazzolo and remarked that the Court designed its regulatory
takings analysis to allow "careful examination and weighing of all the
relevant circumstances.''. As in the takings cases before Tahoe-Sierra,
Justice Stevens pointed out the differences between
• •132 physical appropriations
and regulations that prohibit private use of land. Then, near the end of
the general discussion of regulatory takings law, Justice Stevens briefly
discussed FirstEnglish, noting that the Court limited its holding to a specific

126.

Tahoe-Sierra,34 F. Supp. 2d at 1236-37. The complaint also alleged violations of the

Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses and violations of sections 1983 and 1985 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id.
127. Id. at 1237. Sewer service is one example of an assessment from which the owner of
an undeveloped parcel would receive little benefit. Id.

128. Id. at 1237-39. This process actually involved two trips to the court of appeals; after
the second round of arguments and opinions, the issues were essentially reduced to what
reached the Supreme Court. Id.
129.

Id. at 1255. Although the court found for the defendants under the Penn Central

theory, it held that the moratoria constituted a taking under Lucas for the thirty-two month
period. Id. at 1248, 1251.
130. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764,782
(9th Cir. 2000) (affirming the Penn Central analysis but rejecting the conclusion based on
Lucas).

131. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,322
(2002) (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
132. Id. at 322-25.
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ordinance and suggested that the First English rule
might not apply to
"normal delays" inherent in zoning and planning. 133
After framing the issues, the Court discussed how the district court erred
in applying Lucas. The Court noted that the Lucas categorical rule does not
apply to temporary restrictions, although one may logically draw this
conclusion from the text of Lucas itself.'M The Court stated that if a
landowner's interest in property could be segmented into individual
temporal pieces, any delay placed on development, whether a moratorium
or permit application, would be considered a taking.' This view, the Court
asserted, "ignores Penn Central's admonition that in regulatory takings
cases we must focus on 'the parcel as a whole.,, 136 Because the moratoria
did not constitute a taking of the entire ownership interest, the appropriate
analytical framework was Penn Central,not Lucas.'
The ultimate question for the Court was whether considerations of
"fairness and justice" required a new categorical rule, because Lucas was
not applicable, or an application of the Penn Central standards.'
The
133. Id. at 329. Some commentators suggest that this distinction is not accurate. J. David
Breemer, Temporary Insanity: The Long Tale of Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council and Its
Quiet Ending in the United States Supreme Court, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 24 (2002).
Breemer notes that the Court's rationale is "uncomfortably similar to Stevens's own dissenting
opinion in FirstEnglish." Id. Yet Breemer acknowledges that FirstEnglish did not resolve
the question of when a temporary regulation constitutes a taking; it only held that
compensation is due when a taking occurs. Id. at 25. The debate depends on whether one
views temporary and permanent regulatory takings as different. This schism is discussed in
parts II.C. and M.A., infra.
134. Tahoe-Sierra,535 U.S. at 330-31.
135. Id. at 331. The Court explained why the district court erred in disaggregating the
petitioners' property into temporal segments for purposes of a takings analysis:
With property so divided, every delay would become a total ban; the moratorium
and the normal permit process alike would constitute categorical takings.
Petitioners' "conceptual severance" argument is unavailing because it ignores Penn
Central'sadmonition that in regulatory takings cases we must focus on "the parcel
as a whole." . . . Hence, a permanent deprivation of the owner's use of the entire
area is a taking of "the parcel as a whole," whereas a temporary restriction that
merely causes a diminution in value is not. Logically, a fee simple estate cannot be
rendered valueless by a temporary prohibition on economic use, because the
property will recover value as soon as the prohibition is lifted.
Id. at 331-32 (citations omitted).
136. Id. at 331 (quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,130-31
(1978)).
137. Id. at 331.
138. Id. at 334. The Court was willing to consider the possible implications of "fairness
and justice" in this case and the possible rule that might result:
First, even though we have not previously done so, we might now announce a
categorical rule that, in the interest of fairness and justice, compensation is required
whenever government temporarily deprives an owner of all economically viable use
of her property. Second, we could craft a narrower rule that would cover all
temporary land-use restrictions except those "normal delays in obtaining building
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Court rejected the former alternative because "[a] rule that required
compensation for every delay in the use of property would render routine
government processes prohibitively expensive or encourage hasty
decisionmaking." 3 9 The Court instead adopted the methodology espoused
by Justice O'Connor in her Palazzolo concurrence. 14 Because even a
narrowly circumscribed per se rule might still require compensation for the
most routine delays, and because careful planning is in everyone's best
interest, the totality of the circumstances should be evaluated. 141 In this
case, because the district court determined that thirty-two months was not
an unreasonable amount of time to formulate
the TRPA regional plan, the
42
taking.1
a
constitute
not
did
moratoria
C. The ChiefJustice'sDissent: Six Years, Not Thirty-Two Months
The Chief Justice began his dissent with the Lucas premise: when a
government deprives landowners of all economically beneficial use of their
land, the Takings Clause requires compensation.14 That premise was the
extent of the agreement between the dissenters and the majority. Chief
permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like".... Third, we could
adopt a rule ... that would "allow a short fixed period for deliberations to take
place without compensation-say maximum one year-after which the just
compensation requirements" would "kick in." Fourth ....
we might characterize the
successive actions of TRPA as a "series of rolling moratoria" that were the
functional equivalent of a permanent taking. Fifth, were it not for the findings of
the District Court that TRPA acted diligently and in good faith, we might have
concluded that the agency was stalling in order to avoid promulgating the
environmental threshold carrying capacities and regional plan mandated by the 1980
Compact. Sixth, apart from the District Court's finding.., petitioners might have
argued that the moratoria did not substantially advance a legitimate state interest.
Finally, if petitioners had challenged the application of the moratoria to their
individual parcels, instead of making a facial challenge, some of them might have
prevailed under a Penn Centralanalysis.
Id. at 333-34 (citations omitted). This last consideration hints at a fatal flaw in the petitioners'
argument. The petitioners may have prevailed if they challenged the moratoria as applied to
their individual parcels. The Court noted, however, that its ruling was limited by the facts that
the grant of certiorari did not allow consideration of the last four theories, recovery under a
bad faith theory was limited by the district court's express findings to the contrary, and a Penn
Central analysis was foreclosed because the petitioners did not appeal the district court's
judgment that the facts did not support a Penn Central analysis. Id. at 334.
139. Id. at 335. The Court surmised that a categorical rule requiring compensation for
deprivation of all economic use would apply to building code application delays, zoning
ordinance changes and variances, delays inherent in the investigation of crime scenes, health
codes, fires, and other routine delays. Id. at 334-35. The Court felt that such a severe rule
should be the product of legislative deliberation. Id. at 335.
140. Id. at 335.
141. See id. at 338-39.
142. See id. at 341-42.
143. Id. at 343 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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Justice Rehnquist, in contrast to the majority and the Ninth Circuit,
calculated the taking in Tahoe-Sierraby including the moratoria and other
delays in the case to reach a total of six years. 44 The Chief Justice
concluded that the adoption of the 1984 Regional Plan left the landowners
in the same4 position as they were prior to its enactment: unable to build on
their land. 1
This theory relied in large part on causation arguments." 6 The Chief
Justice admitted that the 1984 Regional Plan did allow construction
contingent on the approval of permits by the TRPA, but he argued that, in
fact, permits were never issued.' 47 Because the Plan would have allowed
construction in violation of other existing ordinances, the district court
issued an injunction that lasted for seven years. 48 The Chief Justice argued
that the TRPA was responsible for the promulgation of its own regulations
and compliance with the Compact so the six-year span -from the enactment
of Ordinance 81-5 in 1981 to 1987-should control.49 Without the
ordinances and the preliminary injunction they precipitated, the 1984 Plan
would have allowed the construction of single-family homes with permits.
Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the TRPA should have foreseen that its
1984 Plan would conflict with earlier ordinances with the effect of
continuing the building prohibition. 5'
Although he calculated a taking of nearly six years, the Chief Justice was
still confronted with the Court's holding that a temporary taking must be

144. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice remarked, "[B]ecause a ban on all
development lasting almost six years does not resemble any traditional land-use planning
device, I dissent." Id. The majority and the court of appeals considered only the period
during which Ordinance 81-5 and Resolution 83-21 prohibited most development in the basin.
Id. at 313-14.
145. Id. at 344 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice did not consider himself
bound by the appellate court's "flawed determination." Id.
146. Id. at 344-45 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Because the plaintiffs sued under § 1983
of the Civil Rights Act, they were required to demonstrate that it was the defendant's conduct
that caused their injury. See id. Chief Justice Rehnquist felt that the TRPA "was
undoubtedly the 'moving force' behind petitioners' inability to build on their land...." Id. at
345.
147. Id. at 344 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting). This reliance on judicial hindsight was
expressly rejected by the majority. Id. at 334.
148. Id. at 344-45 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Plan would have allowed 42,000
metric tons of soil to erode, which exceeded the permissible amount under Resolution 82-11.
Id. (citing California v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 766 F.2d 1308, 1315 (9th Cir. 1985)).
In addition, the district court found that the Plan did not comply with the Compact
establishing the TRPA. Id.
149. Id. at 345 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 346 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
151. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The majority also rejected this view, based on
the district court's findings that the TRPA acted diligently and in good faith. Id. at 334.
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analyzed under Penn Central, not Lucas."' The Chief Justice began by
arguing that the distinction between temporary and permanent regulatory
prohibitions is dubious.153 He relied heavily on the Lucas categorical rule,
that total deprivation, temporary or not, is the equivalent of a physical

appropriation from the landowner's perspective.1 4 The Chief Justice
acknowledged, but dismissed, the majority's concern that a categorical rule
might cause ordinary delays in the development process to be deemed
takings.'
Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that a categorical rule would recognize
certain limitations inherent in the ownership of property.' He conceded
that "background principles" in state property law, for example the law of
nuisance, limit what a landowner can do with his property.5 7 These
background principles, whether grounded in nuisance, the State's zoning
152. Id. at 346 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 346-47 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). This is the same argument the Chief
Justice made when he wrote the majority opinion in FirstEnglish. See supranotes 83 - 84 and
accompanying text. But the question before the court in First English was one of
compensation, not an antecedent takings question. Id. Therefore, the Chief Justice's reliance
on FirstEnglish is misplaced. See Tahoe-Sierra,535 U.S. at 347-48. The Chief Justice's view
does have some support in the literature, however. See Breemer, supra note 133, at 28.
Breemer finds support for this view in the language of First English. Id. This language,
Breemer believes, "seems to mean that a temporary compensable taking results when a
regulation that would otherwise amount to a taking if it were permanent turns out to be of
limited duration." Id. He points out that many courts, federal and state, have adopted such a
reading of First English. Id. Yet the other point of view-the view adopted by the TahoeSierra majority-is also well-advocated. One commentator frames the questions this way: "If
a temporary development moratorium and a temporary physical taking both deny landowners
use of their property, why should the latter action be compensable under settled
constitutional principles while the former is not?" Tedra Fox, Lake Tahoe's Temporary
Development Moratorium:Why a Stitch in Time Should Not Define the PropertyInterest in a
Takings Claim, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 399, 417 (2001). The answer, argues Fox, lies in an
examination of the "bundle of rights" retained by the landowner during a development
moratorium. Id. During a temporary physical taking, the land owner is denied the right to
use, possess, and dispose of her land. Id. A temporary regulatory taking is a bit trickier,
because, as in First English, the regulation is promulgated to last for an indefinite time. Id. at
418. Under this theory, the land owner retains the rights to possess and dispose of her land,
but she cannot use it. Id. Her likelihood of disposing of it for any reasonable consideration,
however, is minimal. Id. Finally, in the temporary development moratorium, the restriction is
by definition intended to be temporary. Id. Even though the land owner loses the right to use
her property, she expects to regain it at some time in the future. Id.
154. Tahoe-Sierra,535 U.S. at 348 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 351-52 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 352 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 351 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice claimed that "[z]oning
regulations existed as far back as colonial Boston,.. . and New York City enacted the first
comprehensive zoning ordinance in 1916. Thus, the short-term delays attendant to zoning and
permit regimes are a longstanding feature of state property law and part of a landowner's
reasonable investment-backed expectations." Id. at 352 (citations omitted).
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power, or other property law, allow routine delays in land-use planning.'58
A six-year ban on development, however, is not inherent in the
"background principles" of property law, the Chief Justice contended, and
should require compensation under the Takings Clause. 9
D. Justice Thomas's Dissent: Temporal Severance
Justice Thomas also dissented, arguing that First English held that a
landowner deprived of all economically beneficial use of his land- even for
a finite time-is entitled to compensation.'6 Justice Thomas disagreed, like
the Chief Justice, with the Court's characterization of the moratoria as
involving only a "temporal slice" of the owners' fee interest. 6' Less
concerned with the length of time at issue, Justice Thomas was convinced
that a taking occurred because landowners were absolutely deprived of the
opportunity to develop their land for some time,62 and he argued that the
Court should have applied the Lucas per se rule.
III. WITH LAND-USE PLANNING IN THE BALANCE, A PENN CENTRAL
APPROACH IS NECESSARY
A. A Logical Progressionin the Court's Regulatory Takings
Jurisprudence
The Court's analysis in Tahoe-Sierra follows precedent in its basic
distinction between physical takings and regulatory prohibitions; more
importantly, it recognizes that there should be different frameworks for
analyzing temporary and permanent regulatory restrictions. Chief Justice
Rehnquist clearly believes that the• ••law163of regulatory takings has no place
for a permanent-temporary distinction. But the Court was wise to avoid a
158. See id. at 351-52 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 352 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice described the nature of
"typical moratoria":
[They] prohibit only certain categories of development... [they] do not implicate
Lucas because they do not deprive landowners of all economically beneficial use of
their land. As for moratoria that prohibit all development, these do not have the
lineage of permit and zoning requirements and thus it is less certain that property is
acquired under the "implied limitation" of a moratorium prohibiting all
development.
Id. at 353 (citations omitted).
160.

Id. at 355-56 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

161. Id. at 355 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
162. Id. 355-56 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
163. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,318 (1987) (noting that, in effect, temporary and permanent takings are
no different); Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 346-47 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that "a
distinction between 'temporary' and 'permanent' prohibitions is tenuous"). But the "rule" of
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universal rule for all regulatory takings-temporary or permanent. It noted
that the issue in First English was compensation, and not the takings claim
itself.1 6 Thus, FirstEnglish does not stand for a categorical takings rule that
requires compensation for any regulation depriving the landowner of all use
of his land no matter how short the duration.1 6 ' FirstEnglish only requires
to compensate the landowner after the Court finds a
the government
taking.' 66
First English that the Chief Justice would have applied in Tahoe-Sierra was not the actual
holding of First English. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
164. Tahoe-Sierra,535 U.S. at 328. The Court asserted that "our decision in First English
surely did not approve, and implicitly rejected, the categorical submission that petitioners are
now advocating." Id. at 329. Because the issue in First English was a "compensation
question" or a "remedial question," extending it to a categorical rule for all regulatory
takings-permanent or temporary-is inappropriate. Id. at 328-29.
165. Id. at 328-29. If this were the case, any absolute regulatory prohibition, no matter
how short, would trigger the government's duty to compensate the land owner. See id. at 33435; see also Terri Pandolfi, Comment, Putting the Cart Before the Horse:Just Compensation
for Regulatory Takings in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1413, 1442-43 (1989). The Court's own jurisprudence prior to
First English recognizes that the Takings Clause requires an examination of both the "use"
and "value" questions. Pandolfi, supra, at 1442. Pandolfi argues that the Pennsylvania Coal
Court was correct in holding that invalidation of an ordinance was a sufficient remedy for a
short-lived taking. Id. In Pennsylvania Coal,an ordinance prohibited mining (the "use") for
a short time, thus allowing the mine operators to recoup their loss quickly (the "value"). Id.
Because the ordinance did not render the property valueless, no compensation was due. Id.
Pandolfi convincingly argues that the First English Court ignored the "value" question and
focused exclusively on the "use" prohibition. Id. at 1442-43. The Tahoe-Sierra Court
implicitly agreed when it said:
[A] permanent deprivation of the owner's use of the entire area is a taking of "the
parcel as a whole," whereas a temporary restriction that merely causes a diminution
in value is not. Logically, a fee simple estate cannot be rendered valueless by a
temporary prohibition on economic use, because the property will recover value as
soon as the prohibition is lifted.
Tahoe-Sierra,535 U.S. at 332.
166. First English, 482 U.S. at 321. On remand in First English, the California courts
found that the governmental action in that case did not constitute a taking. Tahoe-Sierra,535
U.S. at 329. The California Court of Appeal explained:
(1) [T]he interim ordinance in question substantially advanced the preeminent state
interest in public safety and did not deny appellant all use of its property. (2) The
interim ordinance only imposed a reasonable moratorium for a reasonable period of
time while the respondent conducted a study and determined what uses, if any, were
compatible with public safety.
First English Evangelical Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893,
894 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990). The court remanded the case to
resolve the cloud seeding issue. Id. at 907. Moreover, Breemer's argument, supra note 133, at
31, that "the Court failed to explain adequately why the traditional understanding of First
English is erroneous" is unconvincing. He points to similarities in language between Justice
Stevens's dissenting opinion in FirstEnglish and his majority opinion in Tahoe-Sierra. Id. at
34-35. Similarities and mere semantics aside, Breemer's argument cannot succeed. As noted
in supra note 86 and accompanying text, the holding of First English was limited to the
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The Court rightly considered the ramifications of a categorical regulatory
takings rule. The dissenters' view that "ordinary" development delays
would not fall prey to this rule is unconvincing. The Chief Justice is correct
that background principles in state property law limit what a landowner can
do with his property. 167
These principles may include temporary
prohibitions on development.J But Chief Justice Rehnquist never really
answered the question presented in the case. Instead, he simply stated that
the moratoria imposed by the TRPA constituted a taking because they were
too long to be included in the background limitations inherent in property
ownership. 169 This assertion sounds too much like Justice Holmes's
proclamation in Pennsylvania CoalCo. v. Mahon that "while property may
be regulated to a certain
extent, if a regulation goes too far it will be
' 70
recognized as a taking.'
The Chief Justice's approach raises more questions than it answers.
Although he argued that a moratorium of six years was not a background
principle in property law, he proposed no standard for testing whether the
length of a moratorium is acceptable under the limitations of state property
law. 7 In addition, his reliance on the figure of six years, as opposed to the
compensation question. The language on which the Chief Justice and commentators such as
Breemer rely is merely dictum and not binding on the Court.
167. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 351-52 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). These "background
principles" are explained supra note 46.
168. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice suggested, based on a limited
survey of statutes, that a moratorium should not exceed six to twelve months, with shorter
periods being preferable. Id. at 354 & n.5. The Chief Justice noted:
California, where much of the land at issue in this case is located, provides that a
moratorium "shall be of no further force and effect 45 days from its date of
adoption," and caps extension of the moratorium so that the total duration cannot
exceed two years. [The State of Oregon] limits moratoria to 120 days, with the
possibility of a single 6-month extension. Others [Colorado and New Jersey] limit
moratoria to six months without any possibility of an extension.
Id. at 353-54 & n.5.
169. Id. at 353 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that "the duration of this
'moratorium' far exceeds that of ordinary moratoria"). The Chief Justice, without really
explaining his reasoning, stated:
[Ilt has long been understood that moratoria on development exceeding these short
time periods are not a legitimate planning device ....Because the prohibition on
development of nearly six years in this case cannot be said to resemble any 'implied
limitation' of state property law, it is a taking that requires compensation.
Id. at 354.
170. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922). This remark precipitated
the framework eventually announced in the Court's principal regulatory takings cases.
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001).
171. Tahoe-Sierra,535 U.S. at 354 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice was
convinced simply by the duration of the restrictions. Id. But the Court explained that his
reasoning was flawed:
[The Chief Justice's] dissent offers no explanation for why 6 years should be the cutoff point rather than 10 days, 10 months, or 10 years. It is worth emphasizing that
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thirty-two month period relied on by the Court, is fundamentally flawed.'
The ordinances enacted by the TRPA lasted only thirty-two months; it was
a judicially imposed injunction that extended the development prohibitions
an extra forty months. 173 The district court's finding of fact that the TRPA
acted diligently and in good faith foreclosed the Chief Justice's novel
causation theory that the TRPA should have foreseen a conflict requiring
judicial intervention. 174 Thus, the TRPA was not simply stalling, as the
Chief Justice seems to suggest, so that the moratoria could be extended
beyond the enactment of the 1984 Regional Plan.
The majority opinion encompasses what the dissenting opinions ignore: a
categorical regulatory takings test is too inflexible. Temporary restrictions
must instead be analyzed according to the Penn Centralfactors. 11 In TahoeSierra, the landowners were not faced with a total loss of value in their
property, as was the case in Lucas.17 The Lake Tahoe property owners
affected by the moratoria retained significant rights in their property.7 7 The
temporary nature of the restrictions in Tahoe-Sierrais important. While the
landowner in Lucas had no expectation of a future ability to develop his
property, the landowners in the Lake Tahoe Basin had a reasonable
expectation that the moratoria would eventually expire.' As advocated by
we do not reject a categorical rule in this case because a 32-month moratorium is
just not that harsh. Instead, we reject a categorical rule because we conclude that
the Penn Central framework adequately directs the inquiry to the proper
considerations -only one of which is the length of the delay.
Id. at 338-39 n.34.
172. For the Chief Justice's derivation of the six year figure, see supra notes 146-51 and
accompanying text. The Court strongly disputed the Chief Justice's theory, noting that
causation was not within the grant of certiorari, not briefed, and not argued. Tahoe-Sierra,
535 U.S. at 313-14 n.8.
173. Tahoe-Sierra,535 U.S. at 312.
174. Id. at 334.
175. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
176. Tahoe-Sierra,535 U.S. at 330. In Lucas, the state amended its regulations, effectively
giving the land owner the opportunity to apply for a permit. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1011-12 (1992). Because this amendment took place during the
pending appeal, however, the landowner did not have the opportunity to argue the temporary
taking issue at trial, and the Supreme Court decided the case on the issue presented-the
permanent takings claim. Id. at 1012
177. Fox, supranote 153, at 418 (noting that under a development moratorium, the land
owner still retains the rights of possession and disposition).
178. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 311-12 (noting that Ordinance 83-21 was only to be
effective until the Regional Plan was developed). The land owners in this case retained hope
that the moratoria would be lifted; therefore, Tahoe-Sierrais entirely outside the orbit of the
Lucas rule:
[The land owner] can still exclude others from her land. She also retains some
market value based on the future use of her land since only a fraction of the
property's lifetime is affected. Potential buyers may still be available because they
understand the ordinance is temporary, although they may pay less because of the

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 53:209

Justice O'Connor in Palazzolo, a "careful examination and weighing of all
the relevant circumstances" reveals that the Court was
correct in holding
179
that the TRPA moratoria did not constitute a taking.
B. Tahoe-Sierra and Its Implicationsfor Land-Use Planning

One of the strengths of the Court's rule in Tahoe-Sierrais the underlying
recognition of the importance of temporary prohibitions on development
for successful land-use planning. 1' The Court rightly preserved the
distinction between temporary and permanent regulatory prohibitions and
applied a categorical rule only to the latter. The Court's adoption of the
Chief Justice's reasoning would have jeopardized novel planning devices
such as inclusionary zoning. Governments could continue to use these
devices, but the costs of takings compensation would likely be prohibitive.
uncertainties raised by the moratorium. In fact, in the Tahoe-Sierra case, an
appraiser testified that some lots had sold despite the moratorium. Most
importantly, the Tahoe property owner may actually benefit from the moratorium if
a sustainable land use plan is created that preserves the ecological integrity and
aesthetic beauty of her community. In the long run, the enjoyment and market
value she derives from her property may increase.
Fox, supra note 153, at 418 (footnotes omitted).
179. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,636 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
180. Tahoe-Sierra,535 U.S. at 337-38 (calling moratoria "an essential tool of successful
development").
181. Inclusionary zoning is a device used by localities to provide affordable housing. See
Barbara Ehrlich Kautz, Comment, In Defense of InclusionaryZoning: Successfully Creating
Affordable Housing, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 971,972 (2002). Kautz provides a simple illustration of
such a program:
An inclusionary program works like this: A developer proposes to build a new
subdivision, called Sweetbriar, in Suburbia Ritz, USA. The developer plans 100
homes and 100 apartments. Suburbia requires that ten percent of all new homes be
sold at prices affordable to moderate-income families and that ten percent of all new
apartments be rented at prices affordable to lower income families (the affordable
units are sometimes called "inclusionary units"). While the market price of the new
homes is $500,000, requiring an annual income of $144,000, the ten inclusionary
homes are sold to moderate-income families earning a maximum of $89,400 per
year, for $308,000. Similarly, while the market rent of the luxury two-bedroom
apartments is $2,135 per month, requiring an annual income of $85,400, the ten
inclusionary apartments are rented to lower income families, who earn a maximum
of $46,400 per year, for $894 per month. Suburbia controls the resale price of the
homes and rent increases in the apartments so that they remain affordable for at
least fifty years. The net effect is that twenty families are able to live in Sweetbriar
who could not otherwise have done so. The families are happy, as is Suburbia,
which created affordable housing at no public cost. However, the developer finds
himself with $1,920,000 less in proceeds from sales (3.8% less than the $50 million
he would otherwise receive) and with $12,410 less per month in rent (5.8% less than
the $213,500 he would otherwise receive).
Id. at 973-74. Developers have protested these regulations and argued that they constitute
takings, but courts have sided with local governments. Id. at 972. The U.S. Supreme Court
and the California Supreme Court have refused to hear inclusionary zoning cases, so local
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Neither the majority nor the dissenters could determine the time at which
a regulatory prohibition turns into a taking. 8 3 The majority considered it
imprudent to set such a limit and chose to rely instead on the Penn Central
analysis.1 8 The problem created by this approach is that it gives little
concrete guidance to regulatory authorities concerning the outer limits of
their power. Yet this uncertainty is balanced by the Penn Central test; it
encompasses all relevant circumstances. 8 5 Application of Penn Central
allows a regulatory agency to carefully and deliberately consider all relevant
options in formulating a land-use plan. 86

governments can continue to utilize this "effective tool to provide affordable housing." Id.
For more on the mechanics of inclusionary zoning, its history, and the policy debates on both
sides of the issue, see id. at 977-89.
182. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 335. Reexamine the figures in supra note 181.
Assuming that Kautz is correct and that an inclusionary zoning program is meant to endure
for fifty years, the financial effect on the government if it is required to pay for such a
program is large. The developer has lost $1.92 million on the houses and $148,920 in rent in
the first year alone. Thus, in the first year of the inclusionary zoning program, the local
government must pay the developer $2,068,920. Even if we assume that the houses are never
resold, the cost to the government over the fifty-year-period would be nearly $10 million (not
considering inflation). In the unlikely event that the houses are sold on a yearly basis, the
zoning program will cost the government over $100 million.
183. Tahoe-Sierra,535 U.S. at 342.
184. Id. The Court thought that the setting of temporal limits should be left to state
legislatures. Id. at 335.
185. In addition to the Penn Centralbalancing test, one commentator suggests a balancing
approach combining the "critical elements" of at least three Supreme Court cases. Fox, supra
note 153, at 421-22. Tedra Fox would use the following balancing test:
(1) Does the development moratoria further a legitimate state goal? (2) Is there a
substantial nexus between the enactment of the moratorium and the community
land use issues it purports to address? (3) Is the duration of a reasonable nature, as
measured by (a) the property's future land use and value (that is, not so speculative
or uncertain as to destroy all of the property's present value); and (b) the amount of
time required to complete the planning process in a diligent fashion?
Id. (footnote omitted). This balancing approach essentially represents an application of the
Penn Centralfactors to a development moratorium. The first and second questions primarily
go to the character of the government action, while both parts of the third question address
the interference with investment-backed expectations and the economic impact of the
regulation.
186. Tahoe-Sierra,535 U.S. at 340 (noting that "[w]e would create a perverse system of
incentives were we to hold that landowners must wait for a takings claim to ripen so that
planners can make well-reasoned decisions while, at the same time, holding that those
planners must compensate landowners for the delay"). The Court was also worried that "[a]
rule that required compensation for every delay

decisionmaking." Id. at 335.

. .

.

would . . . encourage hasty
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IV. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence may not be as
clear as some would desire.' 87 Penn Central's ad hoc factual inquiry is
inexact because most regulatory prohibitions do not fall into the Lucas
category of outright restrictions on development. 88 However, the Court
recognized that proper land-use planning is necessary and therefore should
not constitute a taking in most reasonable circumstances.
Because a
categorical rule would endanger the practical ability of many governments
to utilize these land-use regulations, a takings question must be decided on
the facts of each case.19 Tahoe-Sierrawas as much about policy as it was
about the law. The ability of governments to regulate property is important
to the health, safety, and welfare of the people and for this reason should
only be restrained in cases where the government has significantly abused
its eminent domain power.

187.

See Kmiec, supra note 12.

188. See Tahoe-Sierra,535 U.S. at 319 (noting that cases like Lucas, in which a regulation
denies all use of land, are "relatively rare").
189. Id. at 339-40.
190.

See id. at 340-41.

